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T his article challenges along two lines Milton Friedman's inj unction that the sole
role of the business manager is to maximize profits for shareholders using all legal
and ethical means. First, it shows how Friedman overly narrows the manager's
moral duties to consequentialist profit maximization and thereby fail s to account
for a wide range of values and virtues necessary for good management. Second, it
illustrates how more oblique approaches to management as we ll as Adam Smith's
virtue-based model better capture the moral imagination and relational aspects
of leadership that are critical to good management today. In the end, this article
suggests that a subtler version of Friedman's directive should be considered in
which maximizing shareholder wealth provides a powerful business goal but not
an exclusive one to direct or to motivate managers.

Milton Friedman promotes two doctrines in Capitalism and Freedom. The first is
in regard to the proper role and use of corporate profits. T he second is in regard
to the moral foundations required for a stable society. Unfortunately, Friedman's
doctrine on profit is often applied without reference to his second doctrine on
ethics (James and Rassekh 2000). In a similar way, Adam Smith's economic
injunctions in The Wealth ofNations are often misunderstood because the moral
underpinnings for them in The Theory ofMoral Sentiments are ignored. In both
cases, an understanding of economic processes is weakened (Evensky 2005;
Young I 997). This a1ticle analyzes the interconnections between the instrumental role of profits and the intrinsic role of morals in Friedman's model, using
for its analytical framework the moral sentiments theory of Adam Smith. The
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article also examines whether Friedman's profit-maximization goal adequately
motivates managerial activity.
The key problem with Friedman's mandate on profits is that it gives rise to
a fundamental inconsistency: On one level, Friedman utilizes a largely consequentialist ethic to explain how markets and economic actors behave, yet he
simultaneously relies upon managers to uphold an intemal ethic based on duty
and virtue. The psychological dissonance created may produce both hypocrisy
and inefficiency. A subtler version of Friedman's injunction on profits and the
manager is warranted, in which virtue ethics might provide a meaningful approach
to motivation within the firm.

The Manager and Profits
Fiduciary Duties and Profit Maximization
Milton Friedman's Capitalism and Freedom contains one of the twentieth
century's most quoted economic passages:
Few trends could so thoroughly undermine the vel)' foundations of our free
society as the acceptance by corporate officials of a social responsibility other
than to make as much money for their stockholders as possible (1962, 133).

He restates this claim in a widely reprinted article in the New York Times
Sunday Magazine (1970). There, he makes two important points. First, he argues
that, "(t)he corporation is an instrument of the stockholders who own it" (I 962,
I 35). Managers are agent-employees of the owners and charged with conducting
business in accordance with the owners' wishes. This typically is interpreted to
mean that managers are to make as much money as possible for the owners and
to avoid other activities that reduce shareholder profits. These other activities
include acts of social responsibility that funnel profits to concerns other than
those approved by stockholders. To do otherwise is, in Friedman's view, a form
of unfair taxation. 1
Friedman then makes an efficiency argument based on the instrumental role
that profits play in a market system . In a free and competitive market lacking
externalities, profits signal the way resources ought to be used in business to best
meet the preferences of consumers. In this view, managers ought not to stand in
the way of the market's free functioning and should not sidetrack the business
by having it attend to social problems such as homelessness, unemployment,
racial disparity, poverty, and so on . These are not the bailiwick of business nor
is there anything in the manager's training that makes him or her expert in aiding
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The Ethical Lacunae in Friedman's
Concept of the Manager
such causes. As Friedman notes: "If businessmen do have a social responsibility
other than making maximum profits for stockholders, how are they to know what
it is? Can self-selected private individuals decide what the social interest is?"
(Ibid., 133).2 Clearly, Friedman thinks managers cannot. Instead, they should
stick to what they do best and the job they are hired to perform: maximizing
wealth creation for shareholders. As we will see, however, Friedman has added
an important caveat that not only limits the manager's profit seeking but also
coheres with the views of an earlier free-market proponent, Adam Smith.

Caveats to Restrain Greed
Although Friedman does claim that managers ought to strive to maximize
profits for shareholders, he also maintains that doing so should not be divorced
from the ethical foundations on which business activity takes place. Managers,
he asserts, ought to maximize profits for owners while conforming to the "basic
rules of the society, both those embodied in law and those embodied in ethical
custom" ( 1970). Unbridled profit seeking is simply unacceptable behavior if such
behavior is outside the mainstream of ethical norms. Managers may neither opt
out nor excuse themselves from laws and customs. Instead, they must abide by
what used to be called the basic "rules ofjustice."
In adding this caveat, Friedman follows the lead of Adam Smith who argued
forcefully against the notion that private vices are public virtues and against the
belief that greed, avarice, and selfishness can contribute to public well-being
(Calkins and Werhane 1998). In Sm ith 's view, people engaged in competitive
commerce can be vittuous because their vittues-in particular, their habits of
prudence, justice, and self-command-are crucial to a well-functioning society
(ibid.). Virtuous people, Smith believed, will uphold "religiously the sacred rules
ofjustice in spite both of the greatest interests which might tempt, and the greatest
injuries which might provoke [them] to violate them" ( 1982, 241). In short, they
will exercise self-command, Smith's preeminent individual vi1tue.
For Smith, as for Friedman, self-interest is subsumed within an ethical framework (James and Rassekh 2000). Smith states clearly that "in the race for wealth,
and honours, and prefem1ents, he may run as hard as he can, and strain every
nerve and every muscle, in order to outstrip all his competitors. But if he should
justle, or th.row down any of them, the indulgence of the spectators is entirely at
an end. It is a violation of fair play, which they cannot admit of' (J 982, 83).
This ethical framework, which includes the notion of justice as fair play, is a
social and ethical, not a legal, construct. lt is the platform on which character and
reputation are forged: "To be anxious, or to be laying a plot either to gain or to
save a single shilling, would degrade the most vulgar tradesman in the opinion
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of all his neighbors" (ibid., 173). For Smith, therefore, regulating oneself-exercising self-command-is of paramount importance. Not surprisingly, he regards
self-command as the preeminent individual moral virtue, one from which "all
the other virtues seem to derive their principal lustre" (1982, 241).
Friedman echoes the Stoic character of Smith's views when he admonishes
managers to exercise self-restraint while running businesses for shareholders.
He challenges them to be unselfish agents of the owners and to refrain from
diverting business resources toward activities that earn economic rent for managers- such as endeavors that boost short-term profits and executive bonuses
at the expense of long-term productivity and profit (Grant 1991 , 911 ). Friedman
thus espouses pro tit seeking but does not advocate greed. Rather, consistent with
Smith, Friedman enjoins managers to stand firm against passions that would
tempt them away from fulfi lling the fundamental fiduciary duties associated
with the principal-agent agreement and from conforming to society's legal and
eth ical norms.

Asymmetric Information and the Subtlety
of Ethical Custom
While Friedman's manager is consistent with Smith's virtuous man at the
abstract level of duties, is Friedman's thesis consistent at a practical level?
Are there times when managers ought not to maximize profits? To answer this
question, consider as an example the CEO of a health maiJltenance organization
(HMO). This company receives the bulk of its receipts from a third party, such
as an insurance company, so that consumers and payments are separated by a
semitransparent penumbra. Suppose a patient visits one of these HMO doctors
complaining of a backache. The doctor in this situation has many treatment
options, each entailing a different level of treatment and potential profit for the
HMO. What should the doctor do?
According to Friedman's injunction, the CEO's imperative is to advance the
wishes of the company's shareholders. lf profit maximization is the goal, the CEO
has a moral obligation to make as much profit as possible so long as no fraud is
committed. Accordingly, the CEO should command that doctors prescribe the
procedures, tests, and surgeries that will generate the most profit for the HMO.
Because backache symptoms indicate a number of possible causes, some of
which could be serious, the doctor could select the priciest treatment options
while still not violating the law or ethical customs. Doctors who overtest can
argue that they are being risk-averse to provide better care or to avoid lawsuits.
The patient would be inclined to go along with the doctor's treatment regimen
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because she lacks the doctor's sophisticated knowledge. In doing so, however,
she and her insurance company will pay an inflated price for treatment of her
backache. Even so, no laws are broken, and the doctor conforms to society's
expectation that doctors alleviate patient suffering.
Exploring the situation fwther, however, it becomes apparent that the CEO's
promotion of profit maximization is not wholly appropriate. For one, the CEO
is taking advantage of the patient's ignorance and likely violates the fiduciary
trust grounding the doctor-patient relationship. The doctor is able to prescribe
the most expensive course of treatment precisely because of information and
financial asymmetry and because the patient trusts that the doctor has her best
interests in mind. Because it is often difficult for buyers to obtain competing
information in some health-care situations, and the consequences for failing
to buy may be life-or-death, this transaction can be seen as coercive (Sandel
I 998). Had the patient the same information and experience as the doctor, and
were the patient paying directly for the treatment, she would not be as inclined
to accept the doctor's expensive treatment option. Lacking such knowledge and
incentives, however, she is exploited by the health-care providers' dictum to
maximize profits.
Nobel Laureate Kenneth Arrow discussed the problem of doctors, asymmetric
information, and ethics in an early book (1974). Doctors who own medical labs
or testing equipment have an economic incentive to order tests, and many do so
at a rate much higher than average (Armstrong 2005). When such moral hazards
exist, the medical community demands- through an ethical code dating back
twenty-four hundred years- that its members put patient interests ahead of other
interests, including those of corporate shareholders. Such a hierarchy of interests
is ambiguous in practice, of course, and so the characters of the CEO and the
doctor matter a great deal. In particular, we might examine the CEO motives as a
basis for analysis. In the case of our backache patient, the CEO must accept that
doctors-and hence the CEO as well-have fundamentally competing duties.
Both the doctor and the CEO as business manager must restrain themselves in
light of the expectations that society has of doctors, whether they are free agents
or employees of health-care enterprises.
These two things, the presence of the need of individuals to adhere to duty
and the necessity of individuals and their employers to acknowledge the expectations of society, illustrate how Friedman's caveats apply in practical situations.
They reveal, too, the subjective dimension of what would seem to be an absolute
application of a free-market requirement to maximize profits. Finally, they show
how the need to limit profit seeking arises in settings where Jaws are not at issue
and where the ethical customs of society are open to interpretation.
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Analogous situations to the doctor can be found in other disciplines. Accountants,
lawyers, engineers, journalists, religious leaders, and others have si.m ilar but
distinctly particular fiduciary standards associated with their vocations.3 In these
and other endeavors, professionals are duty-bound to relegate profit seeking to
secondary status. As with the doctor, managers in these disciplines must recognize
the presence of asymmetric information and hold certain important core values
above the absolutes of the market. 4 Even econometricians have been called upon
to develop a code of ethics in response to numerous problems of asymmetric
information in data collection and analysis (Levy and Peart 2008).
One can surmise that social norms and codes for certain professions arose
precisely because of issues of client vulnerability. Yet, there are many instances
of customer vulnerability where professional codes of conduct are absent. Take,
for example, the situation of a traveler in need of urgent car repair to an isolated
town with only one service station. A nationwide corporation owns the repair
station, and the shop manager faces a decision of whether to maxi.mize profits
for the owners (corporate shareholders) or follow a perceived moral duty to put
the customer's interests ahead of the company's. To some degree, this problem
can be handled adequately by enlightened self-interest in the marketplace. The
car repair shop manager might decide to be honest and not take advantage of the
customer to thereby promote the corporation's reputation for honesty. In this way,
the manager could justify favoring the customer's interests on the grounds that
doing so creates a relationship resulting in greater profits in the long run (Novak
1990). 5 Accordingly, absent a professional code of conduct, the institution of
competitive markets itself- through repeat business- can create incentives for
behavior that conform to ethical standards, even if the motives for action are
avaricious (Smith 1981 ; McCloskey 2006).
Relying upon the consequentialist incentive of enlightened self-interest to
handle all problems of moral hazard is problematical. This is the case, for example,
when sellers do not anticipate repeat business, when buyers themselves are not
responsible for paying (e.g., third-party insurance payers), and when providers
can sustain asymmetric information and lack of transparency. It can also occw·
when managers' bonuses are tied to short-term rather than long-term goals. In
such situations, greed can lead to free riding and inefficiency that can be substantial in certain industries (health care, for one). Resolving such problems is
not easy, but Friedman and Smith provide fairly consistent arguments at both the
theoretical and the practical levels to advocate for market principles restricted
by compelling individual duties and social customs.
Smith and Friedman differ greatly, however, in their attempts to explain the
complex human behaviors that provide a rationale for moral duties. For his part,
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Sm ith offers a nuanced account in The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1982) for
how society inculcates young people in concepts of duty and virtue so that, as
adults, they might come to acquire self-control. This socialization process relies
upon the cultivation of mutual sympathy ("fellow-feeling") that is genuinely
felt. lt demands that self-interest be constrained and often superseded by other
motives.
In many ways, Smith's model individual is similar to Friedman's, but a key
distinction is with Friedman's ethical framework. Smith is a virtue ethicist who
argues (with Hume) that although ethical behavior produces good consequences,
the foundation for ethical behavior lies in the emotional connections of individuals rather than in rational calculations of enlightened self-interest.
Not unlike Aristotle and other of his predecessors, Smith holds virtue to be its
own reward. Sm ith states, " Sympathy ... cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a
selfish principle" ( 1982, 317). Smith's moral sentiments model can then readily
explain how and why an economic actor could behave with duty to customers,
even in cases of one-time interactions and with pervasive asymmetric information, that is, in cases in which enlightened self-interest breaks down.
Friedman's model cannot do the same, and his ideal manager, we will see, is
logically inconsistent. According to Friedman, business executives are bound
by the principal-agent relationship to operate in a deontological or duty-based
ethical manner up the chain of command with their superiors and shareholders.
Simultaneously, they are to pursue a purely consequentialist striving to maximize profits and to disallow intrusions into their conduct such as Smith's moral
sympathy. Managers thereby face a moral dilemma. Tfthey accept the notion that
deontological moral duties should guide behavior, and if deontological moral
duties require that everyone be treated in the same manner, then prefen·ing one
group (shareholders) over other stakeholders on purely consequentialist grounds
is morally untenable. How can this be resolved? Terry Price (2008) addresses
the question using Kantian logic, but the result may be difficult to generalize
and apply in practical situations.
In addition, it is also unclear in Friedman's argument how and why managers
come to acquire fidelity to the concept of moral duty in the first place. Friedman
does not provide an adequate answer and so the logical fallacy in his argument
is this: that capitalism clearly requires duty-bound managers, but capitalist
institutions cannot create or sustain the concept of duty. Paul Heyne ( 1995), an
advocate of markets, succinctly argues this poi_nt:
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The market requires moral foundations which cannot be created by market
transacti ons themselves. Moral foundations are nurtured in communities- in
f~unilies, neighborhoods, religious fel lowships, local political associations,
and other vo luntary groups. By fostering the steady disintegration of these
communities, market transactions may tend over time to undermine the moral
foundations upon which they rest.

This is the first lacuna in Friedman's concept of the manager- that managers must be duty-bound to shareholders but cannot be duty-bound to customers,
workers, suppliers, and other stakeholders. The important exception is ifprofits
can be enhanced by appearing to be duty-bound to other stakeholders, that is,
to appear morally committed to social concerns if doing so enhances community relations, worker efforts, and so on. Managers thus have a dualistic ethical
personality.
This duality at the level of theory suggests a second and practical feature
of Friedman 's argument: Managers are morally authentic when responding up
the chain of command but possibly deliberately inauthentic when manipulating down the corporate hierarchy (as long as no moral norms are broken). The
second lacuna in Friedman's concept of the manager then reveals how Smith
and he diverge at an instrumental level. While both see ethics as achieving some
beneficial outcomes, Smith's concept of the ethical person is fundamentally
nonconsequentialist. Smith uses a virtue-based behavioral model, incorporating intuitions and emotions to study human motivations, while Friedman relies
more upon consequentialist calculations of self-interest and a loose deontology
to establish the duties of managers to corporate shareholders.

Profits and Motivation
In his Nobel Prize address, Douglass North (1994) argued that neoclassical
economics is a poor vehicle for understanding the development of markets
because it generally ignores the role of institutions and path dependencies over
time. Similarly, Kenneth Arrow observed of doctors, institutions, and ethics
that, "one might regard professional ethics as an example of an institution which
fills in some measure the gap created by the conesponding failure of the price
system" (Arrow 1974, 36-37). Both comments illustrate aspects of Friedman 's
model, which is that it is arguably helpful in identifYing the instrumental role
of managers but inadequate for understanding the motives and full range of
managers' duties. 6
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Friedman 's model is limited for one because he argues that maximizing profits
should direct the manager's activities without explain ing the reasons for profit
maximizing being the single and best motivator for managers and entrepreneurs.
The notion that profit is or should be the overarching motivator is problematic
for several reasons. First, it contradicts a common understanding and empirical
research about the ways successful business leaders actually motivate in practice. A slew of management and leadership literature indicates that managers
and entrepreneurs are not motivated primarily by profit maximizing (Adams
1984; Hawken 1987; Osterberg 1993; Ray and Rinzler 1993; Ray and Renesch
1994; Peale, Blanchard, and Peale 1996; Harmen and Porter 1997; Blanchard
1997; and Ffeffer 1998). Rather, they are inspired by ideas and ideals related
to an enterprise.
Second and following from the first point, Friedman's model fails as an
explanation for manager motivation because it relies on a neoclassical econom ic
model ill-designed to provide such explanation. The neoclassical economic model
is a black box containing virtually no behavioral information about the psychological sources of meaning. It explains well how businesses become efficient at
generating profits but does not account for the motives that drive individuals to
produce those profits. lt can explain, for example, how F. W. Taylor's scientific
management's time studies, standardization, and mechanical view of management can increase efficiency to generate higher profits in business, but it cannot
account for the drive, creativity, and circumspection that impel individuals to build
successful instinttions. Moreover, it does not explain the fundamenta l reasons
for engaging the process in the first place. It simply explains process without
reflecting on the merit of the activity. Tt is vulnerable therefore to criticisms such
as Peter Drucker's, who reputedly said, "There is nothing so useless as doing
efficiently that which should not be done at all" (Office of federa l Procurement
Policy, 2004, 16).
Third, Friedman's model is inadequate because there are so many better alternatives to it. A more helpful approach, for example, can be found in the recent
intellectual history of entrepreneurship, which explains a wide range of managerial
motivations (Kalantaridis 2004). Here, we find how profit is a central concern
for managers (especially entrepreneurs) but not the only or even main source of
meaning and motivation. Rather, managers and risk-taking mavericks tend to be
motivated by the desire to achieve, build, ovettake competitors, produce the best,
be first to market, or attain some self-actualizing goal or set of goals. Rivalry, for
one, is a potent motivator. As Adam Smith noted, rivaLry and emulation, spurred
by competition, is usually sufficient to induce "the very greatest exertions" (1 981 ,
760). Such rivalry, as David McCleland argues in The Achieving Society (1961),
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is spurred by the desire to excel and is a psychological process and not simply
a desire for a specific outcome, such as maximizing profits.
Other, more anecdotal observations support Smith's and McCieland's arguments. For example, John Kay's sample of twentieth-century innovations-DNA,
computing, antibiotics, television, and the green revolution in agriculture-illustrates how "financial incentives play ... only a small part [in their discovery],
and the financial rewards for the discoverers were not great. ... The principal
motives appear to be the excitement of the process of discovery, and the social
rewards offered to the renowned scientist" (2004a, 268). Even Donald Trump
admits that, "Money was never a big motivator for me, except as a way to keep
score. The real excitement is playing the game" (BrainyQuote). Motivating goals
can even relate to transpersonal or altruistic objectives. Frank (2004, 79), for
example, found that workers in companies with "socially responsible" profiles
were willing to accept wages far below firms that did not. In the end then, a wide
range of other explanations supersede Friedman's model as an explanation of
manager motivation.
FoUith, Friedman's model does not account for the inspirational sentiments
underlying managerial motives to maxin1ize profits. Although he suggests that
enlightened self-interest motivates managers to maximize profits, managers might
just as easily adopt a pretense of such sentiments to mask their greed. In such
circumstances, a savvy (but cynical) manager might even promote the goals of
corporate social responsibility in the hope that these might increase productivity,
customer loyalty, and ultimately ... profits. This sort of approach is not farfetched.
It befits the modus operandi of many "opportunistic pseudo-transfon11ational
leader(s)" observed by Terry Price (2003, 72).
Adam Smith's model ofbebavioral psychology, in contrast, provides a clearer
rationale for the moral sentiments empowering responsible business practices.
For Smith, the natural sentiment of sympathy (fellow-feeling) is the source of
moral vutue that "cannot, in any sense, be regarded as a selfish principle" ( 1982,
317). In practice, it engenders caution and truthfulness. The reason for this is
simple- because people are adept at discerning the feelings of others similar
to themselves, they can detect deceit. Accordingly, "the prudent man is always
sincere, and fee ls horror at the very thought of exposing himself to the disgrace
which attends upon the detection offalsehood" (Smith 1982, 214). Although
exceptions in the form of superb emotional fakers do exist, it is difficult for
most people to sustain emotional fictions. Most can intuit when another (for our
purposes, a manager) says something he or she does not really believe, and the
resulting punishment of alienation and disgust when individuals are caught in
deception is usually sufficient to minimize widespread hypocrisy.
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Having established the reasons and supp011 for fellow-feeling and honesty,
Smith goes on to note that ambitious people frequently do not know for certain
what they are pursuing. Their objectives are bound up within a social context
so that acceptance and status among their peers becomes their strongest desire
( 1982, 213). As Smith notes: " It is not ease or pleasure, but always honour, of
one kind or another, though frequently an honour very ill understood, that the
ambitious man really pursues" ( 1982, 65, emphasis added). When placed in the
context of business, this means that managers learn to generate profit for the
sake of survival (their own and their firm's), but this is not to say that they are
motivated by profit per se or that they operate best from a psychological perspective in which profit maximization is at the center.
Fifth and finally, Friedman's model not only fails to account for certain
inspirational sentiments, it also fai ls to recognize the importance of .intuition in
motivation. Here, Frank Knight's Risk, Uncertainty, and Profit (1921) is particularly helpful to an understanding of the role of intuition in management and, in
particular, to transfonnational leadership. In Knight's view, risk is an attribute
of a business project for which reasonably well-known probabilities exist. If
insurance markets are deep enough, for example, one can buy policies to protect
against virtually any risk. Uncertainty, on the other hand, is a situation in which
not enough information exists to make reasonable assessments of probability.
No amount of planning or logical assessment can resolve the uncertainty and so
no insurance can be bought to offset its hazards. ln environments of uncertainty,
intuition may be a vital input in production (Kay 2004a, 2004b). As Trump reflects:
"Experience taught me a few things. One is to listen to your gut, no matter how
good something sounds on paper" (BrainyQuote).
lf it is true that intuition and emotion (right-brain functions) are sometimes of
greater use to managers than logical, cost-benefit calculations (left-brain functions), then managers may need to develop imagination, spontaneity, curiosity,
creativity, and connectivity-all forms of moral imagination-a topic to be
addressed next (Goleman 1995, Elster 1998).

Obliquity and Organizational Transformation
While most contemporary management theorists acknowledge Smith's and
Friedman's theories as helpful, these and other early microeconomic theories are
thought to be overly narrow and limited. They consequently have been largely
replaced with approaches that are more expansive and holistic.
John Kay, corporate consultant and former business school dean at Oxford
University, proffers one such new approach that emphasizes "obliquity." Here, Kay
argues that the best way to reach a profit objective is not always to head directly
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for it but to approach it from the side, that is, obliquely. Such an approach is preferable in dynamic situations where systems are "complex, imperfectly understood,
and change their nature as we engage with them" (Kay 2004b). The approach is
especially helpful in multifaceted, interdependent business organizations where,
typically, there is no single, simple, and correct strategy for running operations.
In these dynamic situations-whether the industry is new or mature, has adopted
technology slowly or quickly, is publicly or privately held, has extensive or weak
government regulations, is led by a founding entrepreneur or hired managers, has
low or high margins- managers must balance a variety of competing internal and
external demands to resolve problems. While Friedman's simple admonishment
to maximize profits has an important place in this environment, it is certainly
not an exclusive prescription for business development.
Kay recognizes the limits of traditional direct approaches to management problems and goes on to explain that managers who focus on the simple, well-defined
objective ofprofit maximization often fail miserably. They make the mistake,
in his view, of "underestimating the complexity of the system with which they
(deal) and the value of the traditional knowledge they (inherit)" (ibid.). A better
approach, he believes, is one that provides managers with a holistic perspective
of the corporation; that is, one that enables managers to adapt to and succeed
in a changing world. To buttress his point, Kay observes how few neoclassical
microeconomists are hired by businesses. This, he suggests, is partly because
microeconomic theorists rely on simplistically direct, ahistorical approaches that
do not account for the path-dependent nature of evolutionary business enterprises.
Further, the standard model fails to portray adequately the complex psychological
incentives that motivate today's managers.
The paucity of the standard model that Kay describes high Iights not just the
limits of microeconomic theory but also the failure of economists to account
for one of the theory's central tenets-Smith's notion of sympathy. Sympathy
or fellow-feeling is critical to good management, for by it, "we place ourselves
in [another's) situation, we conceive ourselves enduring all the same tonnents,
we enter as it were into his body, and become in some measure the same person
with him " ( 1982, 9). Sympathy forms the basis of moral imagination and enables
managers to deeply understand and appreciate the employees, investors, suppliers,
customers, and other stakeholders crucial to the success of commercial enterprises
(Werhane 1999; Moberg and Seabright2000). While number crunching skills and
consequentialist approaches that emphasize profit maximization are important,
these alone are insufficient for good management as both today's management
theorists and Adam Smith recognized.
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The key points raised here are first, that Smith 's concept of human motivation does allow for a dominant role to be played by nonpecuniary motives; and
second, that Smith's approach is based on a nonconsequentialist model of moral
sentiments that inspires good management. Smith lays out the biological and
psychological case for human instincts that lead to the formation of moral rules
and norms (Wight 2007; Evensky 2005). While these moral rules serve useful
instrwnental purposes, they arise from an intuitive psychology that operates
through virtue ethics. Given this and within Smith's moral framework, a company might come to represent the best aspirations of its stakeholders, not just
financial rewards for its shareholders. Decision-making might reflect a concern
for creating a process and generating outcomes that uphold self-actualizing
interests (Hawken 1987). Not unlike Michael Porter and Mark Kramer's notion
of "building shared values" as an approach to corporate social responsibility,
managers might generate loyalty and efficiency that more than compensate for
the company's costs (Porter and Kramer 2006, 13).

Conclusion
This article challenges Friedman's doctrine that the pursuit of profit is and shou ld
be the manager's exclusive duty. As shown here, Friedman 's thesis based on
arguments of commutative justice, freedom , and economic efficiency does not
claim that managers are relieved from the constraints of civil and moral laws.
To the contrary, his argument maintains that ethical precepts delimit and create
the foundation for ethical business practices and markets. Friedman's notion
of profit maximization, in sh01t, is not synonymous with selfish individualism.
Rather, it advocates consideration of others and self-restraint or, in Adam Smith's
terminology, sympathy (fellow-feeling) and self-command.
Friedman's argument does, however, raise a logical contradiction. Because
moral tenets come as bundles of duties and obligations- often impossible to
untangle- they cannot be resolved through simple f01mu lae or defined in tem1s
of profit motivation. Some motive or set of motives other than profit maximization is necessaty, and sometimes these other motives can conflict with the
profit motive. A business manager, for example, who believes it is her duty to be
loyal to the owners' interests, might also believe it is her moral duty to tell the
truth-even if doing so might lower profits. James and Rassekh (2000, 671, f2)
rep01t that Friedman, in a personal communication, agreed that in such a situation, truth telling to outsiders was a moral obligation of the business manager
even if this lowered shareholders' profits. Tllis patticular example arose in the
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specific context of threatened third-party property rights that, to Friedman, might
represent a core human right on par with freedom.
For Friedman, the ·fiduciary aspect of the principal-agent agreement is paramount; hence, honesty is a critical vittue. Honesty is not, however, the only moral
vittue relevant to managers, and these other moral vittues become apparent in
practice. A manager might easily find him or herself in a position of having to
decide, for example, whether or not to uphold shareholder interests when doing so
threatens the selfish personal interests of the manager. He or she might also have
to decide about whether or not to tell the truth (a form of honesty) when doing so
could jeopardize the interests of employees, suppliers, and other stakeholders. In
these sorts of situations, relying exclusively upon the principal-agent agreement,
the moral virtue of honesty, and profit maximization is unhelpful. Other values
and virtues are necessary. Friedman 's fonnula does not account for these and
effectively boxes-in managers, forcing them to be only consequentialist in their
dealings with stakeholders. This is Friedman 's first major gap or lacuna.
Friedman's second lacuna involves his insistence on profit maximization
at the expense of itnp01tant motivational issues in management. While the
pursuit of self-actualizing incentives that increase worker loyalty, motivation,
and efficiency would be accepted by Friedman under the rubric of enlightened
self-interest, his requirement that managers calculate the expected gains and
losses from having such nonpecuniaty drives and then pretend to possess them
undermines the strength and efficacy of the approach. Such a consequentialist
reckoning ultimately fails to recognize the genuine relationships of managers as
well as the authentic sympathy and passion (Smith 's fellow-feeling) that inspire
managers, workers, and customers. Hence, this tactic fails to account for moral
imagination-a construct that cannot be conjured up along narrowly rational
and self-interested grounds.
Given these shmtcomings and to offset these lacunae, this article supports a
subtler version of Friedman's directive. It acknowledges that profit maximization using all legal and ethical means remait1s an insightful model of resource
allocation. It proffers, however, that this metagoal can at times be achieved
obliquely by placing other objectives ahead of profit. For example, cultivating
a genuine virtue ethic (as in Adam Smith) may achieve this goal, but not in a
purely consequentialist manner. ln this way, it is hoped, the manager might have
a focused, yet more consistently authentic and humane, moral framework to
guide his or her behavior.
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Notes
I.

Friedman observes that tax laws may mitigate against this because of the double
taxation of corporate profits.

2.

Adam Smith is equally cynical: " I have never known much good done by those
who affected to trade for the public good" (1981, 456). Smith is referring here to
merchants who profess to care for society's interests when they are really lobbying
for legislation that would earn them economic rent (e.g., through protectionism).
Friedman's point is analogous.

3.

Here, vocation is regarded as a response to a calling.

4.

\>Vhat exactly are these absolute laws or institutional rules? Friedman provides only
one example, that of the widespread acceptance of wages in a market system based
on individual productivity. One can think of many others, such as the widespread
acceptance of the legitimacy offairly elected govenm1ents and the widespread adherence to moral injunctions against theft. rt should be clear that transaction costs in
exchange would be much higher in the absence of widespread acceptance of basic
social norms of morality.

5.

Michael Novak makes this distinction: " [T]here is a difference between maximization of profit and optimization of profit. To aim at maximizing profit-that is, to
obtain the greatest profit possible out of every opportunity-is to be greedy in the
present at the expense of the future .... By contrast, to optimize profit is to take many
other factors besides profit into account, including long-term investment, consumer
loyalty, and the sense of a fair service for a fair price" ( 1990, 51).

6.

R. Edward Freeman argues similarly against approaches that take a "narrow economic
view of business," here in tern1s of criticisms ofWal-Mart (2006).
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